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Chapter 7: Implementation Science or ‘Show’ Trial?: England’s PrEP Impact study 
Catherine Dodds, School for Policy Studies, University of Bristol 
 
Abstract 
England’s PrEP Impact Trial ran between 2017 and 2020. This chapter centres first on the 
policy events that first gave rise to the trial underpinned the trial’s genesis. Interviews with 
key stakeholders demonstrate that rather than achieving its aims as practical implementation 
trial that might have enabled and shared learning on the best ways to roll out PrEP, instead 
the Impact trial was designed and maintained as a ‘show trial’ to help manage a policy and 
financial impasse. Those interviewed tended to observe that because Impact’s power 
dynamics were rooted in traditional hierarchies about the production of evidence, this 
undermined its use as anything more than a stop-gap. Ultimately, rather than enabling the 
sharing of lessons for those planning the immanent launch of England’s future PrEP services, 





The efficacy and effectiveness of Pre Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) was first established 
globally through successive randomised (Molina et al. 2015; Grant et al. 2010) and non-
randomised trials (McCormack et al. 2016) focussed primarily on its capacity to reduce the 
risk of sexual transmission among men who have sex with men. Alongside the development 
of HIV Treatment as Prevention over the past two decades, this work has underpinned a 
triumphal global narrative about how preventive uses of HIV antiretroviral treatments would 




with the introduction of HIV antiretroviral treatment in the 1990s, evidence that PrEP worked 
did not mean that accessible services would be implemented to reach all those in need.  
 
This chapter focuses on how PrEP policy in England has played out vis-à-vis the launch of 
England’s PrEP Impact trial in 2017 as the world’s ‘largest single PrEP implementation trial’. 
It purportedly aimed to address ‘significant outstanding implementation questions that should 
be answered prior to using PrEP in a sustained way on a substantial scale in England’ (NHS 
England 2016). These included: understanding how many sexual health clinic attendees need 
PrEP, willingness to take it, and duration – in order to inform an orderly roll-out of PrEP 
services in England (Public Health England and Chelsea and Westminster Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust 2020). On paper, the PrEP Impact Trial existed in order to provide answers 
about how to best provide PrEP through England’s health service, by filling an apparent gap 
between existing scientific knowledge and practical application.  
 
Behind the scenes, however, there were other reasons for the initiation of the Impact trial: the 
trial rhetoric offered an expedient, low cost solution to a political deadlock. This chapter 
offers first-hand insights into these backstage processes, revealing how the questionable 
motives of the PrEP Impact trial have resulted in troubling contradictions throughout its 
progress, which themselves create challenging implications for future PrEP policy in 
England. 
 
7.2 Trials and tribulations 
 
Social scientists of medicine have pointed to profound challenges arising from a knowledge 
hierarchy that has prioritised the randomised control trial (RCT) as the pinnacle of acceptable 
health evidence-making (Wahlberg and McGoey 2007; Deaton and Cartwright 2018). This 
critique argues that the persistence of RCTs as the ‘gold standard’ of knowledge creation fails 
to recognise the ways in which strictly standardised conditions silence the complex social 
dynamics within which all health technologies are ultimately embedded. HIV provides 
exemplary evidence to support this critique, given the widely demonstrated inadequacy of  
focussing disproportionately on the outcomes of experimental research regimes to address an 
epidemic defined by its complex and particularised social, political, moral and economic 
disparities (Fassin 2007; Kingori and Sariola 2015; Kippax and Stephenson 2016; Camlin and 




production often becomes entrenched in systems designed to protect and benefit the interests 
of those organising the trial, at the cost of producing meaningful learning outcomes. As such, 
the HIV response has been profoundly impacted by biomedicalisation that renders the ‘social 
issues (both carried and revealed by AIDS) practically inexpressible’ (Fassin 2007 p. 189).  
 
In response to these critiques of knowledge production, the emergent field of implementation 
science might appear to be a remedy. Implementation research is meant to examine how new 
interventions or technologies that proved efficacious in the controlled setting of the RCT 
might be made effective in ‘real world’ contexts. ‘The basic intent of implementation 
research is to understand not only what is and isn’t working, but how and why 
implementation is going right or wrong, and testing approaches to improve it’ (Peters et al. 
2013). This kind of approach is meant to pick up on contextual cues (including process 
issues, but also social inhibitors) which can then be acted upon in real time through pragmatic 
research design. Therefore, good implementation research is intended to be reliant upon open 
and iterative learning with rich data collected from stakeholders and users across the life of 
the project with regard not only to medical technologies, but also the messier processes and 
procedures of access and activation which are impacted by social interaction, diverse cultures 
of expectation and exchange, systems of meaning and structures of inequality.  
 
However, the PrEP Impact Trial was not designed in a way that could enable it to promote 
this sort of advance through iterative learning. Perhaps this is because practitioners of 
implementation science can find it difficult to escape the habits of power and control that are 
embedded in the scientific knowledge hierarchy. In addition, these habits may have become 
entrenched as the trial practitioners sought to obliviate the trial’s own genesis, given it was 
hastily developed to resolve a financial impasse between key health policy agencies. It could 
also be the case that the trial was simply a means of rationing access to the costly medicines 
being used for PrEP (at a time when they were still under patent), while funding for sexual 
health services across England simultaneously faced serious decline (Nagington and Sandset 
2020). In examining these possibilities, this study provides evidence that the PrEP Impact 
trial was less an implementation trial and more of a ‘show trial’, a term traditionally 
associated with criminal or political trials that are arranged to satisfy public demands or purge 







Using my longstanding network of professional HIV contacts in England, I generated an 
opportunistic (and subsequently snowballed) list of key stakeholders to invite for interview 
between May and August 2019 near the mid-point of the Impact trial. I knew many across 
years of working relationships, including membership of United4PrEP - an activist coalition 
demanding government provision of PrEP. I am therefore embedded in the processes that I 
am analysing. 
 
Table 7.1 Roles of potential and actual study participants 




Clinician/IMPACT trialist 4 1 
Community activist/organiser/HIV organisation (paid and 
unpaid) 
14 10 
Public Health England (PHE) staff  4 0 
Local Authority staff/elected council member 7 2 
NHS England (NHSE) staff 2 0 
Other 2 0 
Total 33 13 
  
The invitation to take part was emailed by a research administrator, and included information 
explaining the aim of undertaking a policy analysis of the Impact’s political and social 
context. Those who agreed to take part included: key PrEP activists some of whom had paid 
roles connected to PrEP activism, and others who did not (including those representing 
women, people in the sex work industry and Black African heterosexuals); senior staff in 
national and local HIV organisations; and Local Authority commissioners of sexual health 
services. Many study participants were members of the trial’s Community Advisory Board, 
alongside one member of the trial’s Programme Oversight Board. Trial clinicians and 
PHE/NHSE staff were invited to take part but almost universally declined, saying things like: 
“Sharing personal views at this point could place me in a conflicted position.” In addition, as 
fieldwork got underway, tensions had been reignited between NHSE and Local Authorities 
regarding proposals to expand the trial, making it a “sensitive time” according to a further 




provided wider perspectives, the data from this sample offer sharp, front-line insights into the 
drivers and responses to PrEP policy in England unavailable elsewhere. Although it is 
important to acknowledge the limited account afforded by these data, the acute reticence 
among particular groups to engage in the study indicates why investigating this trial in light 
of its political and social contexts (rather than from a hegemonic, scientific perspective) is 
essential. The matter of anonymisation was initially left open so that participants could 
exercise a choice to be named – however, as it turned out, very few wanted to be named, so 
the decision has been taken to anonymise all quotes. This study was granted ethical approval 
by the School for Policy Studies’ Ethics Committee at the University of Bristol. 
 
7.4 Why was a ‘show’ trial needed? 
 
Following the earliest efficacy studies that showed PrEP worked, a wide array of volunteer 
PrEP activists self-organised, finding unique ways to disseminate unbiased information and 
to strategically build demand for public provision. These efforts were particularly notable 
among those working in sex industries, within networks of gay men, and among others with a 
particular stake in preventing HIV. A working group on PrEP had already been established 
by the National Health Service in England (NHSE) as early as September 2014 to work out 
costings and service design in anticipation of the results from the PROUD trial. So the focus 
of all of these volunteer efforts from many quarters was to provide information and support to 
help meet an interim gap in reliable information sources, to sustain support for public 
provision, and to support those who were already privately buying PrEP online1.  
 
There was therefore a universal expectation among all stakeholders that national roll-out 
would take place as soon as England’s own PROUD trial had concluded. However, on 21 
March 2016 NHSE made a surprise announcement that commissioning PrEP was outside its 
powers. They argued that because the 2012 Health and Social Care Act had conferred 
responsibility on England’s 343 elected Local Authorities (comprising boroughs, counties 
and municipalities) for public health services, NHSE said they were not in a legal position to 
take responsibility for PrEP provision. This policy backdrop set the stage for a serious 
impasse between Local Authorities and NHSE over who was responsible for considering 
 
1 Notable organisations involved nationally and internationally include: Porn4Prep, I Want PrEP Now, Prepster 




provision of these costly medicines which remained under patent, and their associated clinical 
services – for the purposes of HIV prevention. It was a conflict that once again enabled a 
space for divergent accounts of morality to be debated in public, academic and policy 
narratives, frequently playing on supposed uncertainties in the PrEP evidence base (Sandset 
and Wieringa, 2019). 
 
The National AIDS Trust took NHSE to court, and NHSE’s refusal to consider PrEP funding 
was overturned on appeal (Azad et al. 2018). However, this ‘victory’ was rapidly followed by 
defeat when, in late 2016, NHSE’s annual review of treatments needing specialised 
commissioning did not approve PrEP. Thus, despite widespread clinical and community 
agreement that PrEP would play an important role in HIV prevention in England, the funding 
impasse remained. The PrEP Impact trial emerged as means of temporarily resolving 
uncertainty about whether any publicly funded PrEP could be accessed by those who needed 
it. Participants in my research overwhelmingly and independently identified that the trial was 
primarily set up to enable the legal use of generic formulations of medications (tenofovir and 
emtricitabine) rather than patented Truvada, thereby reducing PrEP’s costs.  
 
[the decision to run the Impact study was driven by] the impact of budget. And it was 
the expedient way to deliver this innovation, umm…within a budget they could 
manage. Doing it under the umbrella of a research project allowed them to use generic 
drugs, which obviously is a fraction of the price of the real PrEP, and therefore 
allowed them to enrol a much larger number than they could have done for the budget 
they felt they could manage. (HIV clinician) #11 
 
If they were going to call it a trial, then they were able to use generic drugs instead of 
branded drugs. (member of staff in local HIV organisation) #4 
 
The kind-of activist discussion was: “If it's a trial you can get generic drugs and what 
we need is access, and if this is the offer on the table then we should take it”. (PrEP 
advocate) #7 
 
Having been widely understood from the outset as the only opportunity of getting anyone on 
to publicly-funded PrEP in the near future, most stakeholders from the HIV sector said they 




trial’ as a fair trade off for PrEP access. This open secret was said to have been widely 
acknowledged among those in PrEP activist networks who had closely followed events. 
 
Nobody really wanted a trial, and nobody could really see – actually, no, that’s not 
true. Some people could see there will be some benefit in terms of the objectives of 
the trial, but to be frank, it was a just a vehicle: to enable as many people as possible 
to access PrEP in the quickest possible way. (member of staff in national HIV 
organisation) #8 
 
When asked what they felt the ultimate outcome or legacy of the IMPACT Trial was likely to 
be, half of all participants felt that the single gain provided by the study was that it had been 
the only strategy for enabling tens of thousands of people in England to get PrEP without 
having to pay for it privately.  
 
I think undoubtedly it will have stopped hundreds of people sero-converting, in spite 
of all of its problems and it has got PrEP to lots of folk. Is it good enough? No. But I 
think that’s its legacy, other than that I can’t really think of [its legacy] to tell you the 
truth. (member of staff in local HIV organisation) #9 
 
However, despite several respondents acknowledging their initial attraction to this short-term 
solution, many described how their perspective on the value of this expedient solution had 
changed as the trial progressed. At the half-way stage of the Impact trial, when our interviews 
were taking place, many said they were no longer able to keep up the pretence that this was a 
real trial, because the duplicity had pushed them towards burnout. These participants said 
they felt increasingly debased by the particular performance required by the trial narrative as 
a study to support and inform future roll out, when the reality was that it had only ever been a 
managerialist mechanism designed to mitigate costs.  
 
We have for the longest time been colluding with each other that we need this trial for 
these reasons and the reasons really are about finance. It’s that kind of disingenuous, 
dishonest process that has absolutely worn me down. (sexual health commissioner for 





Those most directly involved in trial governance described being surprised by the ‘rules of 
engagement’ during formal trial meetings, including unspoken hierarchies of power which 
aimed to silence those who might pull back the curtain between the trial’s front-stage and 
back-stage. 
 
One of my key questions [during official trial meetings] has always been what does he 
or she think? Does he or she know that this is a crock of shit? Could we have that 
conversation privately? I’ve come to realise we can never have it publicly. 
(member of staff in national HIV organisation) #5 
 
While most continued to adhere to ‘rules’ governing what should and should not be publicly 
expressed about the true nature of the trial, three interviewees (each involved in different 
ways) said they had openly critiqued the trial’s façade. In each case, these individuals 
mentioned the personal costs of raising their concerns within and beyond the trial’s own 
structures. While the conclusions of this chapter emphasise structural and population-level 
implications of this trial, it’s the personal and intra-personal toll for advocates and others 
working closely in and around PrEP Impact was at times considerable. Most of the 
stakeholders interviewed for this study had been closely involved in England’s HIV 
landscape for a number of years, so they are not strangers to the political realities of 
compromise and pragmatism. However, most described the Impact trial as a particularly 
troubling and exhausting conflict zone which served to further alienate those who hold 
different understandings of what constitutes valuable ‘evidence’ from one another, while 
simultaneously driving wedges between stakeholder groups, organisations and individuals.   
 
7.5 The trial as an expression of power  
 
As one would expect of a clinical trial, governance and oversight were held centrally by those 
in PrEP Impact’s uppermost structures (including the trial team and senior figures in Public 
Health England and NHSE who chaired the Programme Oversight Board – or POB - which 
managed the trial’s externally-facing narrative). Framed as an ‘implementation trial’ to help 
answer real world questions of uptake and access in order to test and inform future service 
design, around half of interviewees pointed out that the inflexibility of the trial structure, 
meant that no space was created for iterative learning. It appears that the sanctity of following 




studies, seriously inflected this project. Stakeholders described how their recommendations 
to: better promote Impact to diverse audiences,  help simplify patient management, support 
the sharing of live information about clinic spaces, monitor the impact of PrEP on the mental 
health and wellbeing of diverse users,  and to better support the user experience, were 
ignored. Community stakeholders consistently reported gaining the impression from the 
outset that their suggestions were regarded as meddlesome and irrelevant. Some reflected on 
other implementation studies where the relationships between triallists and their stakeholders 
were more engaging, ongoing and meaningful, with inbuilt opportunities to implement 
iterative learning throughout a trial’s progress.  
 
[The trial leads] could have had community representation, and they chose to keep 
that separate as a Community Advisory Board [CAB]. (HIV clinician) #11 
 
While this interviewee said that the trial team had tried to engage with community 
stakeholders, all other interviewees who sat on the trial’s CAB consistently described it as a 
distinctly arms-length mechanism for disseminating updates from the centre. Some felt the 
CAB was a site for playing out community disputes, and had become consumed by ‘busy-
work’ – rather than having their diverse forms of expertise meaningfully valued and 
incorporated. It remains unclear the extent to which the POB might have played a role in 
establishing these patterns, and to what extent it functioned on a different premise to the trial 
team.  
 
A prevalent theme from the majority of interviewees was that those leading the trial sought to 
enforce the concept of data integrity as a disciplining tool, arguing that all trial outcomes 
would be tainted if strict adherence to the protocol was spoiled2. The argument that strict 
control of data flow was essential to maintain its integrity was, according to many, a key 
means the trial committee centralised its power by restricting access to meaningful interim 
data. What they described instead was Impact’s own failure to function as an implementation 
trial, because it had disabled its own capacity to learn iteratively, study its own processes and 
procedures, adapt accordingly and study the ensuing effects. By the half-point stage of the 
 
2 A few of those interviewed did note that a change in the clinical leadership part way 





trial, information about the demographic features of trial participants remained strictly 
confidential and cynicism was widespread among almost all of those interviewed. A high 
proportion of participants expressed considerable concern that it would only be at the end of 
the trial that it would become apparent how few people other than men who have sex with 
men had been enrolled (with concerns about limited diversity even among this group), 
meaning the trial had curtailed its own capacity to learn what might have been done 
differently in order to understand and best meet the diverse needs of potential PrEP users.  
 
Most interviewees drew links between controls on data-sharing and the trial protocol’s stated 
intent not to promote PrEP, but instead to use a non-interventionist trial design that assessed 
and offered PrEP to eligible individuals already attending sexual health clinics. As a result - 
they argued - marginalised MSM, Black African migrant men and women, trans people, and 
workers in the sex industry remained at increased HIV risk because of their experience of 
barriers in accessing traditional sexual health services. There was concern that because many 
were not tuned in to the social media channels of most PrEP activism, it was even less likely 
that marginalised people would find out about PrEP – even despite the considerable efforts of 
dedicated volunteer sex workers, women and trans people who sought to help overcome these 
types of obstacles.  Ultimately, what concerned these interviewees was that the ‘show trial’ 
would ultimately broaden those same gaps because of the trial team’s determination to only 
enable access for existing users of sexual health services, while simultaneously not 
supporting any form of promotion.   
 
We need to understand what Black-African women need to uptake this, so we need to 
build that into the trial, it wasn’t about that. It was like, “All communities that are at 
risk will understand their risk in the same way”. (PrEP advocate) #2 
 
Despite early assurances of ‘ringfenced’ trial allocations for groups at high risk of HIV 
beyond MSM, at the trial half-way point participants broadly agreed that the ringfencing 
strategy had failed, and that this was in part because the trial did not allocate funds for 
campaigns to support the promotion of information about PrEP or for trial recruitment.  
 
For those other communities we needed some investment and that wasn’t done, that’s 





Outside of the trial, Public Health England subsequently funded a few community groups to 
provide PrEP awareness interventions for targeted populations through its HIV Prevention 
Innovation Fund. Some other community organisations provided information about PrEP and 
the Impact trial from their own resources. However, stakeholders made it clear that these 
piecemeal arrangements did not amount to anything like the required national coordination or 
scale to ensure that news of PrEP’s availability through the trial might reach a sufficiently 
diverse range of people in need in ways that would help ensure that the sample it gained 
could adequately and fully inform future services across England. Despite repeating their 
concerns at successive CAB meetings, stakeholders were deeply concerned that the sharing 
of trial evidence that had been promised was subsequently sequestered. This meant that 
collective learning would be delayed until the formal publication of results, long after such 
lessons could pragmatically be implemented into service plans.    
 
Is PrEP reaching the people that need it now, is it reaching people in their diversity? 
No. Is this trial going to lead to routine commissioning? Not necessarily. Is it gonna 
lead to equitable access? Almost certainly not, because they are I think going to 
conclude from this trial that some people just don’t need or want PrEP. (PrEP 
advocate) #7 
 
Ultimately, most stakeholders expressed frustration that despite the time and energy they had 
committed to supporting and enabling the Impact trial, they had come to realise it had been 
organised as a means of rationing PrEP demand via the trial’s highly managerialist structures. 
At the outset, maximum trial allocations were dispensed to each of the 139 clinic sites, and 
20% of the trial’s 10,000 spaces were ringfenced for members of high-risk groups beyond 
MSM. Early demand was predictably strongest in urban locations with high MSM density, 
and as trial sites started to open in late 2017 some allocations filled rapidly. A new section of 
the trial website was quickly developed with the intention of directing (primarily MSM) users 
to clinics that still had available spaces for different user groups. In the summer of 2018, the 
‘non MSM’ ringfence was dropped from 20% to 10% due to purportedly low demand among 
those who were not cis-gendered men who have sex with men. Some asserted that the posture 
of restraint about trial recruitment and promotion was a purposeful tactic to rein in spending 
not only for the trial itself, but as a means of rationing demand for the commissioned service 





Places for getting homosexual men [were getting] filled up so then the solution was to 
say, “Well we overestimated the number of women that might use PrEP”. No you 
didn’t because you didn’t estimate, you just came up with a number. It was never an 
estimate and it was never calculated properly. (PrEP advocate) #7 
 
There was a real concern that this focus on demand management had not only pitted people 
against one another within the HIV sector, but among communities in need.  
 
I know there were people who are involved in the process who are quite annoyed. If a 
gay man who is really genuinely at risk goes somewhere and it’s full. And then you 
say, ‘oh, we have 1000 places reserved for Blacks’. And when they are not accepted, 
they are thinking, ‘it’s not right. It's not right’. I honestly think that inadvertently, they 
are really making people feel very bad. (member of staff at a local HIV organisation) 
#4 
 
A tiered set of inequalities had emerged, described by the participant above, with well-
informed gay and bisexual men facing increasingly unpredictable access to trial places, 
accompanied by vanishingly low figures for more diverse men who have sex with men, and 
people having heterosexual sex. With so much ongoing change, community organisations and 
potential PrEP users they were supporting were increasingly unclear which clinics were 
accepting what categories of people into their remaining trial places.  
 
Despite the strict expectations attached to the confidentiality of all trial data, it was notable 
during these interviews just how frequently some details and figures appeared to have leaked 
out among those on the CAB and those playing a role in other trial committees. However, 
such figures could never be formally acknowledged or built into future planning, they 
essentially only held ‘hearsay’ status.  
 
You know, only four percent of these places have been taken up by non-MSM people, 
and that’s really crazy! (member of staff at a local HIV organisation) #4 
 
There was a lot of discontent about the inequalities of access that had become apparent 





I think still a lot of people will have misunderstood it as a medical study [ie. RCT 
with placebo]. That inherently will have put so many communities off, particularly 
communities that often feel like they are not cared for and won’t be cared for if the 
medical study is wrong. Particularly Black communities and even a lot of sex worker 
communities can feel like they’ll all just be the lab rats. (PrEP advocate) #13 
 
It was a trial that was designed for and about gay men, and particular gay men. (PrEP 
advocate) #7 
 
This concern therefore added to many participants’ disquiet about ways in which the PrEP 
Impact trial had further entrenched existing bias in HIV prevention services towards urban, 
middle class white gay men who tend to disproportionately use the sexual health clinics 
through which the trial exclusively operated. During our interviews, participants had begun to 
predict how the failure to recruit and learn about PrEP needs amongst diverse populations 
would directly imprint itself onto future service design, built primarily around ‘ideal users’ 
who are already routinely attending sexual health services (Holt, 2015; Young et al. 2020). 
 
Adding to the complexity of this ‘show trial’ was NHSE’s announcement that they would 
support additional medication costs that could enable the trial to expand first to 13,000 in 
June 2018, and then to 26,000 places in the spring of 2019 (NHS England n.d.). The latter 
announcement to double the trial size created significant conflicts with Local Authorities who 
carry responsibilities for running all of the sexual health clinics where the Impact trial was 
sited. Most balked at the match-funding needed to support the additional clinical caseloads 
and follow-on screening that would accompany trial expansion. Uneven and protracted 
negotiations ensued, with many local commissioners arguing that they could not afford the 
costs within a context of extensive funding cuts driven by a national politics of austerity. 
These conflicts were reported widely in the gay, local and national press, further 
compounding confusion about trial places for those who might want to enrol. Then, in the 
midst of the fieldwork for this study, on 5th July 2019, the NHS National Director of Special 
Commissioning released a letter via Twitter that said he was “asking the trial researchers to 
support open ended additional places where any clinic and their local authority commissioner 
would like them” (Stewart 2019). Therefore, not only were the earlier attempts to ration trial 
places widely regarded as causing divisions and entrenching inequalities among those most 




played out between NHSE and Local Authorities. These developments also raised questions 
about the inherent contradictions built into Impact’s trial structure. Each time the NHSE 
made an unexpected announcement supporting trial expansion, this further deepened the rifts 
which had opened between these large institutional players. The vastly different working 
cultures between the highly centralised structures represented by Public Health England and 
the National Health Service, contrasted with hundreds of Local Authorities run by publicly-
elected representatives came sharply into focus through the way the Impact trial had been 
managed. 
 
So privately [among local authority commissioners] for example, there is lots of, ‘We 
can never trust NHS England again’. […] there’s been an ugly fraught process, but 
that will be its legacy. (sexual health commissioner for a Local Authority) #12 
 
This same individual described the impossible position in which they had been placed, being 
expected gain approval for even more of their Local Authority’s funds to support clinical 
provision for further trial expansion, while still having no access to interim trial data.  
 
I’ve got to take this back to a whole range of people and sell it, so throw me a fish for 
Christ’s sake! Throw me something that can help me sell this back at base. (sexual 
health commissioner for a Local Authority) #12 
 
All participants expressed frustration about the continual conflicts between NHS and Local 
Authorities on responsibilities for additional running costs as the trial progressed and grew. 
The ‘show trial’ had been constructed in order to overcome conflicts about who would pay 
for PrEP but became the new location where that disagreement played out. Many participants 
took the view that the Impact trial was unable to resolve weaknesses caused by longer term 
disinvestment in sexual health service provision and HIV prevention, and that it could not be 
expected to resolve broader infrastructure challenges. The ‘show’ trial was devised as a 
means of squaring the circle, finding what appeared to be an ingenious way to keep down the 
costs of high-priced patent protected medicine by gaining legal access to generics instead. 
However, its carefully rationed access served to further entrench the structural determinants 
of health, which for many participants had become a more relevant issue than attempting to 





The Impact trial will finish with some limited data that will help us in our future 
planning and it's not going to solve the rest of the problems that still exist because of 
political and economic and cultural disinvestment in our sexual health services. (PrEP 
advocate) #1 
 
The reason why a lot of London clinics have not taken up the new places is because of 
capacity. So they don’t have capacity in terms of seeing more patients. So I think that 
will be a kind of big impact. I think that, in terms of the trial itself, I think that one of 
the challenges they have is that they don’t want to acknowledge some of the 
challenges they are facing. (clinic staff member) #3 
 
Some participants reflected on the way that these wider frustrations were ultimately directed 
into disputes over the machinations of the trial itself with the fall-out of these conflicts  
resonating across the sector. They described how this situation had dramatically increased 
internal competition between actors for funds, attention and recognition, thereby deflecting 
attention away from the under-resourced structures in which in which all actors were situated. 
All of this was understood to have resulted from careful PrEP rationing which had been 
crafted as part of the trial design. As a result of these combined factors, few of those 
interviewed expressed any confidence that the Impact trial could meet its goal of 
meaningfully shaping how England could deliver PrEP in the future.  
 
Interviewer: What kind of legacy will we end up with as a result of the Impact trial? 
Participant: In terms of what will we know? 
Interviewer: Sure. 
Participant: What will we know that we don’t know now? 
Interviewer: Yes. 
Participant: I don’t know, because it’s difficult to…[long pause]… I’m really 
struggling with that question, I’m afraid, I really am. 
Interviewer: That’s fine. 
Participant: I’m not sure how to answer that because there are still so many 
questions. (sexual health commissioner in a Local Authority) #14 
 
Most tended to agree with this sentiment, because in their view, Impact had neither pursued 




service design, nor had it shared any of what it had learned. In addition to this, along the way 
the trial’s managerialist control functions had helped to sow discontent, distrust and conflict 
between groups were meant to be working towards the joint goal of HIV prevention. 
 
7.6 The Impact study and PrEP’s future in England 
 
The PrEP Impact trial was framed as an implementation study but stakeholder accounts 
demonstrate the ways in which it is best regarded as a ‘show’ trial - concocted not as a 
genuine implementation study but an inherently flawed attempt to bypass conflicts between 
national and local government actors. While this compromise solution did enable access to 
generic PrEP for thousands who would have either had to pay for it privately or do without, 
even that element of the trial’s success is mitigated by a range of associated harms.  
 
Rather than celebrating the trial’s ‘gains’, the majority of interviewees felt exhausted and 
personally complicit with a trial infrastructure that had actually served to deepen conflict and 
distrust between the very agencies who would need to co-commission the PrEP services of 
the future (NHSE alongside hundreds of Local Authorities), and also between some voluntary 
organisation actors. Furthermore, the vast majority of participants expressed profound 
concern that the implementation trial had actively functioned as a mechanism of healthcare 
rationing (Nagington and Sandset 2020), creating an expansion of barriers to PrEP’s 
accessibility among the socially and economically marginalised. This trial was structured in 
ways that disabled many in need from learning about or receiving PrEP. The costs of the 
inequalities fostered by and woven into the fabric of PrEP provision in England through the 
Impact trial are inestimable. The feature of the trial that is most culpable for this state of 
affairs was its ongoing attachment to a hierarchy of evidence-making that prioritised process 
and ‘purity’ over functional outcomes. 
 
Central to the stated outcomes of Impact was that it was meant to inform good 
commissioning practice when PrEP services were finally rolled out. To this end, in June 2018 
the trial’s Programme Oversight Board established a Short Term PrEP Commissioning 
Planning Group which was tasked with devising a set of recommendations for future PrEP 
Commissioning in England. These would be informed by trial outcomes and interim learning 
gained up to that point and shared for dissemination among key stakeholders. However, the 




writing, England’s Department of Health and Social Care has released commissioning 
directions and PrEP treatment budget allocations for Local Authorities which needs to be 
implemented within an extremely short timeframe, (personal communication, 2020) while the 
Short Term PrEP Commissioning Planning Group’s report and recommendations, 
commissioned by the Impact POB, remain suppressed.  
 
With Local Authority sexual health commissioners expected to pull together a PrEP service 
in the four months between the release of commissioning directions and the conclusion of the 
Impact trial, there is no expectation that there will be any sharing of insight from those 
holding the trial data during this short planning period. This is perhaps one of the most potent 
demonstrations of this trial’s particular performance of the making of evidence from before 
the start of the trial to beyond its finish (Rhodes & Lancaster 2019). Rather than working in 
collaboration to share information that will benefit the design of immanent service, the 
evidence remains in the hands of the actors closest to the centre of this show. Presumably that 
evidence will be packaged and prepared for future academic publication in esteemed 
scientific journals, but this does not meet the practical needs of planner and implementers 
who are rapidly having to design England’s new PrEP service, with no functional insights to 
glean from the Impact trial. The only thing that has been made clear to current planners, is 
that when this service launches, state-funded PrEP will still only be accessible to those 
already using sexual health clinics. As with other ‘show’ trials, the final conclusions of the 
PrEP Impact trial will contain few surprises, and once all the final reports are written there is 
small chance of anything being done to address the way this trial has further entrenched 
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